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FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION OVER
ACTIONS BROUGHT BY ALIENS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act'
(FSIA) in 1976. The FSIA confers jurisdiction in the federal district
courts over actions against foreign states that are not entitled to
immunity.2 In addition, the Act codifies the restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity,3 and prescribes that the presence of immunity
defeats jurisdiction in suits against foreign states in all courts of the
United States.4
In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,5 a Dutch corpora-
tion sued the Central Bank of Nigeria on a non-federal claim.6 The
plaintiff claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the broad lan-
guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).7 The district court dismissed the claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction under section 1330(b), reasoning
that Central Bank was entitled to immunity under the FSIA.8 The
court concluded, however, that there was federal question jurisdic-
tion under section 1330(a) in a case where an alien was suing a for-
eign state on a non-federal claim.9 On appeal, the Second Circuit
found that section 1330(a) did attempt to confer jurisdiction in cases
between aliens and foreign states involving non-federal claims, but
held that such a grant of jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The
court affirmed the dismissal without reaching the personal jurisdic-
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
1602-1611 (1976).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) grants the district courts jurisdiction over "any non-
jury civil action against a foreign state. . . as to any claim for relief in personam with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.. under sections 1605-
1607 of this title." .d.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sss. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. The restrictive theory rec-
ognizes sovereign immunity with regard to public acts but not with respect to private or
commercial acts. Id. The FSIA defines commercial activity and enumerates specific
exceptions to immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605-1607 (1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
5. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982).
6. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
afd 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982).
7. Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 1302. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 1292, 1293.
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tion issue.'0
This Note will first explore whether a suit between an alien and
a foreign state arises "under... the Laws of the United States""1I
when the only federal law in issue is the FSIA. The Note will then
discuss whether subject matter jurisdiction may be based on an exer-
cise of congressional power outside the limitations prescribed in arti-
cle III of the Constitution. Third, this Note will examine the
legislative history of the FSIA to determine whether Congress
intended section 1330(a) to confer federal jurisdiction over suits
between aliens and foreign states. Fourth, this Note will discuss
whether Congress should amend section 1330(a) to constitutionally
provide for federal jurisdiction in alien actions against foreign states
in light of the possible international ramifications of such a grant.
Finally, this Note will suggest possible amendments to the FSIA that
would avoid the constitutional difficulties inherent in granting fed-
eral jurisdiction over actions between aliens and foreign states when
no federal substantive law is in issue.
II. VERLINDEN B. V v. CENTMRdL BANK OF NIGERIA12
Verlinden, a Dutch corporation, brought suit in federal district
court to recover damages resulting from a "breach and repudiation
by Central Bank of its obligation with respect to an irrevocable letter
of credit."'13 Verlinden alleged that Central Bank violated the Uni-
form Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits' 4 by unilater-
ally amending an irrevocable letter of credit. Central Bank
challenged the district court's jurisdiction, claiming that section
1330(a) does not provide for subject matter jurisdiction over actions
brought by aliens against foreign states when no federal law is in
issue. The court found that both section 1330(a) and a similar
10. 647 F.2d at 330.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. There is no explicit provision in Article III, section 2
for suits between aliens and foreign states as there is for controversies between a citizen
of the United States and a foreign state. See id.
12. 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a ffd 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
13. Id. at 1287. Central Bank is an instrumentality of the government of Nigeria,
and it is therefore entitled to the same degree of immunity as the government itself.
14. Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (Rev. 1962) (The
International Chamber of Commerce Brochure No. 222). See Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at
1287, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Central Bank contracted to purchase 240,000 metric tons of
cement from Verlinden, a Dutch corporation. The bank also agreed to establish "an
Irrevocable, Transferable abroad, Divisible and confirmed Letter of Credit in favour of
the seller for the total purchase price through Slavenburg's Bank, Amsterdam, Nether-
lands." Id. at 1287. Verlinden alleged that Central Bank subsequently failed to establish
the letter of credit according to the terms of the contract. In addition, Central Bank
allegedly altered the conditions of payment after it became clear that it had purchased
too much cement from several suppliers. Id.
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removal provision in the FSIA15 provided for jurisdiction and
removal in "any civil action' 16 involving a foreign state, including
an action between an alien and a foreign state.' 7 The court also con-
cluded that the plain language of the FSIA prescribed "substantive,
federal criteria for determining the validity of assertions of sovereignimmunity" and injected a "federal element into all suits brought
against foreign states."18 Consequently, the court found that "the
case is one that 'arises under' a federal law because the complaint
compels the application of the uniform federal standard governing
assertions of sovereign immunity."' 19 The court, however, dismissed
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction under section 1330(b). 20
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal2' with-
out reaching the issues of personal jurisdiction and immunity.22 It
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976) provides:
Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state... may be
removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon
removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury ....
16. Id. See Perlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
17. Perlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1302. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976) provides: "Personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) ... ." Id. (emphasis added). The district court rea-
soned that because it had jurisdiction only when a foreign state is not entitled to immu-
nity, a foreign state is subject to personal jurisdiction only when that state is not entitled
to immunity. See Perlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1293. The court reviewed the possible
exceptions to immunity and found that none were applicable in this case. Id. at 1293-
1302. The court found Central Bank to be entitled to immunity and thus not subject to
personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b). Id. at 1302. It is unclear why the court did not
simply find the lack of immunity grounds for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under § 1330(a).
21. Perlinden, 647 F.2d at 330.
22. Id. The Second Circuit should have considered whether asserting personal juris-
diction over Central Bank violated due process requirements. The only connection
between the transaction and the United States was the involvement of the Morgan Bank
in the payment of the letter of credit. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292, 297 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). It also should have considered
whether Central Bank was immune from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If the
court had found the due process requirements lacking, or if the court had found that
Central Bank was entitled to immunity, there would have been no need to consider the
constitutionality of asserting subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a). The judicial
policy of avoiding constitutional construction whenever possible mandates such an
approach.
Significantly, in four cases decided the same day as Perlinden, and involving plaintiffs
with United States citizenship, the Second Circuit used the minimum contacts test. For
example, in Texas Trading & Mills Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981), the court found that Nigeria had minimum contacts with the United
States, and held that Nigeria was not immune from the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in cases concerning contracts almost identical to those in Perlinden. See id. at 310-13. In
Texas Trading, the court found that Central Bank and Nigeria had "purposely availed
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concluded that the controversy between the two parties did not sat-
isfy any of the bases of subject matter jurisdiction enumerated in
article III, section 2 of the Constitution. 23 The court recognized that
article III does not explicitly provide for federal jurisdiction over
controversies between aliens and foreign states,24 and that conse-
quently jurisdiction in Verlinden could be based only on the judicial
power to adjudicate cases or controversies arising under the Consti-
tution, the laws, or the treaties of the United States.
25
The court first reviewed possible bases of federal question juris-
themselves" of the privileges of conducting activities in the United States, and had "rea-
son to expect to be haled before a... court" in the United States. Id. at 314-15 (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216
(1977)). In addition, the court found that litigation in the United States was not "unduly
inconvenient" for Nigeria and that the United States had a "manifest interest in provid-
ing effective means of redress for its residents." Id. at 315 (quoting McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). Based on its analysis of these four
factors, the court found the "minimum contacts" requirement satisfied.
Three of the factors that persuaded the court in Texas Trading are also present in
Verlinden. The parties utilized a United States bank to complete their transaction.
Because Central Bank also signed similar contracts with United States citizens, there is
no reason to believe that litigation in the United States would have been unduly inconve-
nient for Central Bank. Id. at 314-15. Although Central Bank might not have expected
litigation in the United States concerning its contract with Verlinden, it still could foresee
that it might be haled into a United States court. The fourth factor, the interest of the
United States, is lacking in Verlinden. The Second Circuit may have decided that the
presence of the first three factors was enough to satisfy due process requirements, and
therefore the court did not discuss the issue.
The Second Circuit's failure to address the immunity issue is less justifiable. In Texas
Trading, the plaintiffs were United States citizens and the payment in issue was to be
made in the United States. Under those facts, the court found that a breach of a letter of
credit was a commercial activity that had a "direct effect" in the United States. Id. at
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). In Verlinden, the plaintiff was Dutch and payment was
to be made in the Netherlands. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 322. The court, however, declined
to speculate as to whether a transaction involving a foreign plaintiff and a foreign pay-
ment had a "direct effect" within the United States. Thus, the immunity of Nigeria was
an open question. If the district court was correct in finding Central Bank immune there
was no reason to consider the constitutionality of asserting subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1330(a).
23. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; . . . - to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party to Controversies between two or more States; -
between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different
States; . ..and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
24. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 325. See U.S. CoNST., art. III, § 2. In Hodgson and
Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 303 (1809), the alien plaintiffs failed to
allege that the defendants were Maryland citizens. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789
gave the circuit courts jurisdiction over all suits involving aliens, Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that "the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the consti-
tution" and dismissed the case. 9 U.S. at 304.
25. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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diction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.26 It found that there is juris-
diction under section 1331 when: "the federal law creates the cause
of action," 27 when "the plaintiff's complaint discloses a need to inter-
pret a federal law,"28 or when "the court finds a national interest so
strong that a judge-made federal rule of decision preempts the state
law that would otherwise govern the cause. ' 29 The court concluded
that none of these bases of jurisdiction are present in an action pre-
mised solely upon the FSIA.30
After finding that it lacked jurisdiction under section 1331, the
court considered whether federal question jurisdiction within the
scope of the "arising under" language of article III was wider than
the jurisdiction under section 1331, and if so, whether the scope of
the "arising under" language was broad enough to include a suit
brought by an alien against a foreign state. The court concluded that
a statute conferring jurisdiction over "any suit against a foreign
state" could not confer jurisdiction over suits between an alien and a
foreign state, absent a federal substantive rule of decision.3 1 The
court relied on Mossman v. Higginson,32 in which the Supreme Court
stated that the district courts did not have jurisdiction over a suit
between aliens when the only federal law in issue was a federal stat-
ute granting the district courts jurisdiction in all cases in which an
alien was a party.33
26. 28 U.S.C. § 133I (Supp. V 1981) provides: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions ... [arising] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States."
27. Verinden, 647 F.2d at 325. This test originated in Justice Holmes' opinion in
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). The
Supreme Court later found this test to be too restrictive. Thus, it is not the exclusive
basis of § 1331 jurisdiction. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326.
28. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180 (1921). See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
29. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 367 (1943). In Verlinden, the court considered each of the tests as sufficient to pro-
vide jurisdiction. See Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326-27.
30. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326-27. The court dismissed the first and third tests as
inapplicable. It also determined that the second test was inapplicable because the immu-
nity issue was not disclosed in the plaintiff's complaint. The only federal law involved in
the complaint was the FSIA, and since the FSIA does not confer substantive rights but
only regulates judicial practice, the complaint did not disclose a need to interpret a fed-
eral law. Id.
31. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 328. The court asserted that the FSIA was not a statute
conferring substantive rights but one regulating judicial practice. Id. at 327.
32. 4 U.S. (Dall.) 12 (1800).
33. Id. at 14. See also Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.)
303 (1809). InMossman the plaintiff failed to allege his own citizenship, thereby creating
a defect in the pleading. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over suits between a citizen
and a citizen of a foreign state was not present in Mossman. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the court reasoned that if section 1330(a) could give rise
to federal jurisdiction, then all federal jurisdictional statutes could
provide the basis of federal question jurisdiction; thus, "(t)he consti-
tutional diversity grant would be surplusage." 34 Thus for the con-
cept of diversity jurisdiction to have any significance, only cases
arising under federal substantive law may give rise to jurisdiction.35
Because the court found that the FSIA did not confer substantive
rights,3 6 it held that there was no subject matter jurisdiction under
section 1330(a).
III. JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN ACTIONS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES UNDER SECTION 1330(a)
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The principal issue in Verlinden is whether the Constitution
allows the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits between
an alien and a foreign state when the only federal law in issue is the
FSIA.37 Article III, section 2 of the Constitution defines the limits of
federal judicial power.38 Section 2 of article III does not provide
federal court jurisdiction over suits between an alien and a foreign
state when there is no federal law in issue.39 Thus, this Note will
focus on that section of article III granting federal court jurisdiction
in all cases "arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and Treaties made. '40
1. The Scope of the "Arising Under" Language of Article III
The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "arising under"
primarily in cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331,
commonly known as the federal question statute, grants jurisdiction
to the district courts over any case that "arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States. '41 In Louisville andNash-
ville AA v. Mottley,42 the Court held that "a suit arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiffs
statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon
34. Id. at 329.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. Neither court considered jurisdiction based upon Congress's article I powers.
Arguments on both side of those issues will be considered herein. See infra notes 71-107
and accompanying text.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp., 1981).
42. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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those laws or that Constitution." 43 In subsequent cases the Court
stated that a suit arises under a federal law when it is clear from the
plaintiff's cause of action that the right asserted depends upon the
construction of a federal law44 and that construction is an essential
element of the plaintiff's cause of action.4 5
The exact meaning of section 1331, however, is not determina-
tive of the constitutionality of asserting federal court jurisdiction
under section 1330(a) over disputes between aliens and a foreign
state. An examination of Supreme Court cases dealing with this
issue reveals that the "arising under" language of article III, section
2 of the Constitution receives a broader interpretation than the iden-
tical language in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.46 Thus, article III may provide
jurisdiction where section 1331 does not.
The Supreme Court, however, has had few opportunities to dis-
cuss the meaning of the "arising under" language of article III, sec-
tion 2. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,47 Chief Justice
Marshall held that a case "arises under" the laws of the United
States if a claimed right may be defeated by one construction of a
federal law and sustained by a different construction of that same
43. Id. at 152. In MAotley, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against
the railroad to compel performance of the railroad's agreement to issue free passes to the
plaintiffs. The railroad made the agreement in consideration for the plaintiffs' decision
to drop a prior suit. The plaintiffs' alleged that the railroad refused to perform because a
subsequent Act of Congress prohibited the issuance of free passes by interstate railroads.
Id. at 150-51. The Court held that the plaintiffs' cause of action was not based on a law
of the United States, but only alleged an anticipated defense based on federal law. Id. at
152.
44. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-200 (1921). In
Smith, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the trust company from investing funds in farm
loan-bonds. The Federal Farm Loan Act authorized the bonds, but the plaintiff claimed
that the act was unconstitutional in that the Constitution did not authorize the issuance
of the bonds. Id. at 195-98. The Court said it was clear from the cause of action that the
plaintiffs asserted right depended on the resolution of a question of federal law. Id. at
199, 201.
45. See Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936), involv-
ing an action brought in state court against First National Bank for unpaid state taxes.
Id. at 111-12. The bank removed the case to federal district court where it was dismissed
on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal and upheld the removal on the
ground that Mississippi's power to tax a national bank originated in a federal statute.
Thus, the suit for failure to pay a tax was based on a federal statute. Id. On appeal the
Supreme Court found that the tax was a state tax and that state law created the right to
sue for it. Id. at 115-16. Thus, there was no federal law creating a right essential to the
plaintifi's cause of action. See id. at 112. Therefore, the district court did not have juris-
diction under § 1331 and its dismissal on the merits was improper. Id. at 118.
46. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515-16 (1969); Swickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 246 n.8 (1967); National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. 582, 614
(1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Mishkin, The Federal "Quesdon"in the District Courts,
53 COL. L. Rxv. 157, 160-62 (1953); 13 C. WRiGrHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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law.48 Marshall concluded that as long as the right is an essential
ingredient of the claim it need not be explicitly stated in the cause of
action.49 Despite the identical language, section 1331 is narrower in
scope because it requires that the federal law in issue must be set
forth explicitly in plaintiff's cause of action.50 Nevertheless, both
article III and section 1331 require that the controversy involves
rights dependent on federal law.
2. The PSIA as the Source of a Right Dependent on Federal Law
When an alien sues a foreign state, there is federal question
jurisdiction only if the cause of action involves a right dependent on
federal law.5' Thus, where the only federal law in issue is the FSIA,
the controversy must involve some substantive right dependent on
the FSIA. The FSIA, however, is not a substantive rule of law which
determines the rights of the parties. The resolution of immunity
issues under the FSIA determines only whether or not the court has
jurisdiction; it does not determine the substantive rights of the
parties.52
The FSIA does prescribe "exclusive standards to be used in
resolving questions of immunity.' '53 These "exclusive standards," as
well as federal court determinations of immunity, bind the state
courts.54 Although they appear to do more than regulate the juris-
diction of state and federal courts, these standards nevertheless do
not affect the substantive rights of the parties.5 5 Thus, although the
48. Id. at 822.
49. Id. at 824.
50. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
51. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320.
52. The entire statute refers to immunity from jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602, 1604, 1605 (1976). But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976), gov-
erning immunity from attachment and execution of a foreign state's property. This por-
tion of the statute may govern substantive liability, for example, in an action to execute
on a judgment against a foreign state. In an action to win a judgment in the first
instance, however, immunity from suit is a purely jurisdictional matter, and the substan-
tive sections of the FSIA are not in issue.
53. House Report, supra note 3 at 6610. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604-07 (1976), for stan-
dards of exceptions to immunity.
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1976). See also House Report supra note 3 at
6610, 6612.
55. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
One commentator has argued that the FSIA represents an exercise of congressional
regulatory power over foreign relations and foreign commerce pursuant to article 1.
Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68
VIRGINIA L. REv. 893 (1982). That commentator recognizes that the standards of immu-
nity embodied in the FSIA define state court as well as federal court jurisdiction over
actions against foreign states. To bind state courts, Congress must invoke an article I
power beyond its traditional regulatory power over the federal courts. The commentator
concludes that such regulatory action pursuant to article I powers represents a congres-
sional policy concern outside of its concern with the scope of judicial power. Under this
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FSIA prescribes a "uniform federal standard" 56 of immunity appli-
cable in both state and federal courts, and "injects an essential fed-
eral element into all suits against foreign states, ' 57 it does not satisfy
the requirements of the "arising under" language of article III as
construed in Osborn and the section 1331 cases. In both federal and
state courts, the substantive rights of the parties are still determined
solely by state law.5 8
Furthermore, even if the immunity standards are characterized
as substantive federal law, these standards are not ingredients of the
alien plaintiffs cause of action.:9 Under the FSIA, sovereign immu-
nity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defend-
ant.60 An anticipated defense involving federal issues, however,
cannot be a basis for jurisdiction over an alien's cause of action.6 1
Sovereign immunity issues do not arise until the foreign state pleads
its defense. Thus, if jurisdiction in suits by aliens against foreign
states is governed by the statutory federal question standards of sec-
interpretation, the FSIA is not purely jurisdictional, and the congressional policy concern
provides the basis for federal question jurisdiction.
Congressional action pursuant to powers outside the regulation of federal courts, how-
ever, does not necessarily provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction. The source of
congressional power to enact a given statute should not be determinative of the substan-
tive nature of that statute. A federal statute precluding state court jurisdiction over all
actions against foreign states would invoke congressional powers outside of its power to
regulate the federal courts. Yet, such a statute in and of itself would not provide a basis
for federal question jurisdiction. The fact that Congress invoked its powers over foreign
commerce to bind state courts under the FSIA, therefore, does not provide a conclusive
answer to the question of whether or not the FSIA is a law that gives rise to federal
question jurisdiction.
The commentator also notes that the FSIA represents a congressional policy concern-
ing the liability of foreign states in certain circumstances. He argues that this policy
satisfies the federal question requirement and invokes the protective power of the federal
courts. Id. at 915-18. Professor Mishkin advocates a similar position where Congress
has an "articulated, active policy in a particular area." See infra notes 76-80 and accom-
panying text. This view of what constitutes a federal question has never been accepted
by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 71-107 and accompanying text.
56. See Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
57. Id.
58. The legislative history of the FSIA does characterize immunity as an affirmative
defense to be raised by the foreign state. House Report, supra note 3 at 6616. One might
argue that characterizing immunity as an affirmative defense defeats the plaintiffs right
to depend on the FSIA as a basis ofjurisdiction. Regardless of how one characterizes the
immunity issue, however, there is no doubt that immunity defeats only jurisdiction, not
the rights of the plaintiff. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
There is little question that Congress may make immunity an affirmative defense to an
allegation of liability pursuant to its article I powers. If Congress were to do this, a
determination of immunity would determine the rights of the parties. At present, how-
ever, immunity defeats only jurisdiction.
59. See Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936). See
also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
60. House Report, supra note 3 at 6616.
61. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
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tion 1331, the immunity issues clearly cannot provide the basis of
federal question jurisdiction.
A suit against a foreign state is based upon section 1330(a), not
section 1331. This Note will consider, therefore, whether Congress
intended that the standards applied in section 1331 cases should also
govern jurisdictional questions under section 1330(a), or alterna-
tively, whether the Constitution requires a plaintiff's cause of action
to depend upon a federal law.62 In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall
indicated that to support federal question jurisdiction a federal sub-
stantive law must be at least an ingredient of a plaintiffs cause of
action.63 In addition, although the statutory requirements for section
1331 may not govern section 1330(a), considerations similar to those
applicable to section 1331 apply to section 1330(a).64 Consequently,
jurisdiction under section 1330(a) may be limited by the section 1331
requirements of federal question jurisdiction. If section 1330(a) can
be constitutionally or statutorily limited to the section 1331 require-
ments, then immunity issues raised only in a foreign states' defense
cannot support subject matter jurisdiction.65
Congress has not prescribed any federal substantive law to gov-
ern suits against foreign states. Congress did not intend the FSIA to
affect the substantive law of liability.6 6 The law governing a suit
against a foreign state is the same as that governing a suit against a
private party.67 Thus, if no other federal law is in issue, state rules of
decision apply in suits against foreign countries.
In enacting the FSIA, Congress might have intended that when
foreign countries are sued under state law the applicable state law
has the force of federal substantive law.68 If this were true, state law
would be incorporated in a federal rule of decision. An alien plain-
62. The federal question statute does not exhaust the limits of federal judicial power
based on the "arising under" language of article III. See supra note 46 and accompany-
ing text.
63. See Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824).
Marshall concluded that "when a federal question... forms an ingredient of the origi-
nal cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that
cause. The right of the plaintiff to sue cannot depend on the defense which the defendant
may choose to set up." Id.
64. There is no legislative history indicating what the scope of§ 1330(a) should be in
regard to federal question jurisdiction. This might be because Congress never considered
that aliens might sue foreign states in United States courts. In enacting the FSIA, Con-
gress simply intended to provide a forum for United States plaintiffs. In all probability,
Congress thought the diversity grant under article III, § 2 was sufficient to support the
jurisdiction of § 1330(a). See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
66. House Report, supra note 3 at 6610.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
68. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), incorporating state crimes into federal criminal
law governing federal lands.
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tiff would have a federal claim despite the fact that state law is the
source of this claim. It is clear, however, that Congress never
intended the FSIA to incorporate state law into a federal law of lia-
bility. Both the statute itself and the legislative history of the FSIA
indicate that Congress did not intend, by incorporation of state law
or otherwise, to enact a federal law of liability.69 Jurisdiction, there-
fore, cannot be based upon a FSIA-created law of liability.70 With-
out a body of federal liability law or standards of immunity as bases
of federal question jurisdiction, the FSIA does not provide a basis of
jurisdiction within the limits of article III.
3. Constitutionality of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Alien
Actions Against Foreign States Outside the Limits of Article III
At least three Justices of the Supreme Court have maintained
that Congress, pursuant to its article I powers, may expand federal
jurisdiction beyond the limits of article 111.71 If subject matter juris-
diction over alien actions against foreign states is constitutional even
though the source of that jurisdiction is outside the limits of article
III, section 1330(a) may be sufficient to support jurisdiction.72 Fur-
thermore, a number of commentators suggest that some jurisdic-
tional statutes alone may satisfy the "arising under" language of
article III.73
In National Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater,74 Justice
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976); House Report, supra note 3 at 6610, 6621.
70. The FSIA does govern one area of liability; it precludes recovery of punitive
damages from a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). This is not sufficient, however, to
raise a federal question if the cause of action does not claim punitive damages or if the
claim is frivolous. In erlinden, the plaintiff's cause of action did not include a right
dependent on federal law. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
71. Neither the district nor the circuit court in Verlinden discussed a constitutional
basis for subject matter jurisdiction outside the conventional limitations of article III.
The constitutionality of jurisdiction over disputes between aliens and foreign states
may already be settled for the purposes of § 1330(a). In Hodgson and Thompson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), the Court faced the question of whether Con-
gress could confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over controversies between aliens.
Chief Justice Marshall held that the statute conferring jurisdiction over controversies
involving an alien could not "extend. . .beyond the limits of the Constitution." Id. at
304. Section 1330(a) jurisdiction is analogous to the jurisdiction in Hodgson-it confers
jurisdiction in actions against foreign states. This jurisdiction may not extend beyond the
limits of the Constitution. Developments since 1809, however, may have diminished
Hodgson's authority. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
72. See National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
(1949).
73. See Mishkin, supra note 46 at 192-96. See also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBL. 216, 224-25 (1948).
74. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
Tidewater involved the validity of a statute granting jurisdiction to the federal courts
over suits between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of the slate. Three
Justices (Jackson, Black, and Burton) found that article I, section 8 gave Congress power
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Jackson argued that Congress, pursuant to its legislative power to
govern the District of Columbia, could expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond that delineated in article III.75 Professor Wes-
chier argues that Congress should be able to confer federal jurisdic-
tion in all cases where it has the power to enact substantive law but
chooses not to do so.76 Unlike Justice Jackson's view, this theory
suggests that the Congressional grant of jurisdiction is itself a law
within the meaning of the "arising under" language of article III.77
Finally, Professor Mishkin suggests that where Congress has an
articulated, active policy in a given area, the "arising under" lan-
guage supports federal jurisdiction over cases in that area even if the
case is governed solely by state law.78
Each of these theories has met strong criticism. Although Jus-
tice Jackson's opinion in Tidewater represented the majority result,
six justices, two concurring and four dissenting, wholly rejected the
reasoning supporting article I expansion of the judicial power.79
These Justices contended that the history of article III indicates that
the authors of the Constitution clearly intended the enumerated
bases of jurisdiction in article III to be the exclusive source of federal
jurisdiction.80 The Justices also argued that if Congress could use
article I to expand jurisdiction, there would be no limit to the pow-
ers, both judicial and non-judicial, that Congress could confer on the
judiciary.81
In his dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama,8 2 Justice Frankfurter criticized the Wechsler and
Mishkin theories. The case arose out of the Supreme Court's con-
to enact such a statute. Two Justices agreed that jurisdiction was present, but only within
the limits of article III. Four Justices dissented on both rationales.
75. See id at 591-96. Justice Jackson contended that in fact the Supreme Court had
approved of several statutes conferring jurisdiction in cases where there was no article IlI
basis for judicial power. Notable examples of jurisdiction based on a power outside arti-
cle III are statutes that provide for federal jurisdiction where a trustee in bankruptcy
brings an action to recover a debt under state law, or where a party brings a claim against
the United States. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of
possible article III bases of power supporting such statutes.
76. Wechsler, supra note 73 at 224.
77. Id. at 225.
78. Mishkin, supra note 46 at 192.
79. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80. See National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
615-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring), at 647-50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), at 631-36
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting); Mishkin, supra note 46 at 191.
81. Justice Frankfurter suggested that Congress could expand the judicial power to
include advisory opinions. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 648 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
82. 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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struction of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.83 Section 301 con-
ferred federal court jurisdiction over contract disputes between
employees and labor organizations.8 4 The Court held that section
301 required federal courts to apply federal common law in such
cases.
85
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that section 301 prescribed federal common law as a rule of deci-
sion.8 6 Consequently, Frankfurter had to consider the constitution-
ality of federal jurisdiction where there was neither diversity of
parties nor an issue involving federal substantive law stated in the
cause of action. 87 He argued that traditional notions of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction would be vastly extended if Congress could confer
jurisdiction based solely on its potential, but unexercised, power to
enact substantive legislation.88 Frankfurter noted that "every con-
tract or tort arising out of a contract affecting commerce might be a
potential cause of action in the federal courts." 89 He concluded that
the judicial power could not be extended this far.
Despite the importance of determining the limits on the judicial
power and upon Congress's power to extend federal jurisdiction
beyond article III, the state of the law remains unclear. No majority
opinion of the Supreme Court has accepted either Justice Jackson's
article I theory or the "protective jurisdiction" theories. To the con-
trary, in Tidewater six Justices rejected Justice Jackson's article I the-
ory. This rejection, however, was not the Court's holding;90 thus, the
theory still may have some validity.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly passed upon
these various theories, the Court has approved several congressional
statutes that are arguably justifiable only under those theories. In
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,91 the statute in question granted
83. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 301(a) 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
84. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448,456-57 (1957).
85. Id. at 456-57. Thus, the Court found that the case did arise under federal sub-
stantive law. Id. at 457.
86. Id. at 460-69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 473-77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The majority found federal common
law in issue, and thus found no need to address Frankfurter's dissent.
88. Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter contended'that only the the-
ory that state courts were inadequate to determine a given state law could justify "protec-
tive jurisdiction" such as that suggested by Professor Wechsler. Id. at 475 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
90. The Court held that district courts had jurisdiction in cases between citizens of
the District of Columbia and citizens of a state. National Mutual Insurance Co., v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (Jackson, J., opinion and Rutledge J.,
concurring).
91. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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the Bank of the United States the right to sue and be sued in the
federal courts.92 Chief Justice Marshall held that the right of the
Bank to sue depended upon an interpretation of federal law. In
Marshall's view, the right to sue in and of itself supported federal
question jurisdiction, even if the right were not in issue in a particu-
lar case.93 In addition, the Supreme Court has implicitly approved
jurisdiction in cases involving congressional statutes providing for
federal jurisdiction in actions brought by trustees in bankruptcy,94
even though the actions are based upon state claims and there is no
diversity of citizenship. 95 Moreover, the Supreme Court has not
questioned the validity of statutes granting district court jurisdiction
over claims against the United States, even though some of these
claims may arise solely under state law.96
The proponents of the Jackson, Wechsler, and Mishkin theories
argue that if these statutes are valid, the source of federal judicial
power must be found outside the traditional limits of article III. In
Tidewater, Justice Jackson contended that by approving the bank-
ruptcy statutes and by examining the source of congressional power
to allow suits against the United States, the Supreme Court indicated
that the sole source of judicial power over these actions derived from
Congress's article I powers. 97 Professor Mishkin, on the other hand,
explains that Osborn and the bankruptcy cases involve areas where
92. Id. at 817. Bank of the United States Act, 1 Stat. 191, ch. 10 (1791).
93. Id. at 822, 824.
94. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S.
367 (1934).
95. In neither case did the Court expressly address the issue of article III jurisdiction
or the source of the judicial power exercised. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 46 at
§§ 3521, 3542.
96. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) (1976).
97. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591-96
(1949). In Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), the Court held that the Court
of Claims was a legislative court and that the source of judicial power was not article III,
but article I. Id. The Court reasoned that the judicial power over controversies to which
the United States is a party only extends to those controversies where the United States is
a plaintiff, not a defendant. Id. at 577. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In Tidewater,
Justice Jackson recognized that suits against the United States could be brought in the
district courts. Thus, following Williams, Jackson argued that because claims against the
United States do not fall within the article III judicial power, Congress must have con-
ferred jurisdiction of the federal courts outside the judicial power of article Ill. See
National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 593 (1949).
Justice Jackson also found that Congress conferred jurisdiction outside of article III
over actions brought by a trustee in bankruptcy. In Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934) and Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947), Jackson found language indicating
that Congress's power to enact the statutes derived from its article I power over bank-
ruptcy, and that there was no article III basis for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 595. Because
the bankruptcy statutes were valid, Jackson found that the expansion of judicial power
outside the limits of article III must also be valid. See infra notes 100-06 and accompa-
nying text for an alternative explanation of the results in the above cases.
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Congress has an articulated, active policy.98 In Mishkin's view, such
a congressional policy satisfies the "arising under" language of arti-
cle III. 99
Despite Jackson's and Mishkin's argument that the source of
federal jurisdictional power must be found outside of the traditional
limits of article III, these cases and statutes may be justified within
the limits of article III. l°° In Osborn and the bankruptcy cases, the
rights dependent on federal law were an original ingredient of the
cause of action. In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall found that the
Bank's right to sue depended on a federal law, and that this was an
original ingredient of every action involving the Bank. 101 Similarly,
in the bankruptcy cases the trustee's powers and the assignment of
the bankrupt's claims all depended on federal law.'02 Under the
98. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934). See Mishkin, supra note 46 at 192, 195.
99. See Mishkin, supra note 46 at 192, 195.
100. See National Mutual Insurance Co., v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
609-13 (1949) (Rutledge J., concurring), for an alternative explanation of the cases relied
upon by Justice Jackson. Rutledge noted that Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933) was decided with O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), and that
both opinions were written by the same Justice. In O'Donoghue the Court accepted the
view that Congress can grant both federal and nonfederal judicial power to the courts of
the District of Columbia and held that nonfederal jurisdiction was conferred pursuant to
Congress's article I powers over the District of Columbia. The Court stated, however,
that Congress does not possess that power over courts outside the District of Columbia.
Id. at 551. Thus, Justice Rutledge concluded that in both Williams and O'Donoghue the
Court rejected article I based expansion of the judicial power outside the District of
Columbia. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 610
(1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring). He further noted that although claims against the
United States could not fall within controversies to which the United States is a party,
such suits arise under the laws of the United States and thus still fall under the judicial
power of article 111. Id. Thus, Rutledge concluded that federal district court jurisdiction
over claims against the United States is within the limits of article II.
Consider also the views of Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter that jurisdiction over
suits brought by a trustee in bankruptcy is conventional federal question jurisdiction. Id.
at 611 (Rutledge, J., concurring); at 652 n.3 (Frankfurter J., dissenting). They note that
in fact the claim of a bankrupt could not have been brought in a federal court but for the
Bankruptcy Act. They argue, however, that because the claim is associated with bank-
ruptcy, Congress has the power to prescribe that the trustees bring the action in a federal
court as a controversy arising under the federal bankruptcy laws.
101. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824).
102. The bankruptcy cases do not explicitly reject article III as a basis of jurisdiction.
For example, in Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934), Chief Justice Hughes recog-
nized that Congress has the power to confer jurisdiction in such cases, but he did not
expressly address the source of the judicial power. Rutledge noted that in Beeler Hughes
agreed with an opinion of a court of appeals judge which, inter ala, grounded the judi-
cial power over such suits in article III. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 612 (1949) (Rutledge, J. concurring).
Furthermore, the meaning of the language in Austrian which Justice Jackson relied
upon to find jurisdiction outside of article III is unclear at best. See supra note 97. In
Austrian, Chief Justice Vinson declared that Congress intended to confer jurisdiction
over trustee suits "even though diversity or other usual ground for federal jurisdiction is
lacking." Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 657, 658 (1947). Vinson may have been
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Osborn rationale, these rights are original ingredients of every
action. 0 3 Finally, federal jurisdiction over actions brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act,'04 and the Tucker Act 05 can be sup-
ported as actions arising under a federal law or as actions to which
the United States is a party.'0 6 All of these bases of jurisdiction are
within the limits of article III.
Explanations of the above cases provide little indication of the
present state of the law. A majority of the Supreme Court never has
accepted or rejected any jurisdictional theory in this area. Six jus-
tices in Tidewater, although not agreeing on the result, did reject Jus-
tice Jackson's article I theory. In addition, the Court's silence
regarding Mishkin's and Wechsler's theories may indicate that it will
not accept such an expansion of the traditional notions of the "aris-
ing under" language.'0 7 Consequently, section 1330(a) probably
cannot constitutionally extend federal jurisdiction to suits brought
by aliens against foreign states when no federal substantive law is in
issue.
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AS TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER
ALIEN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES
In Verlinden, both the district court and the court of appeals
found that it was unclear whether Congress intended to make the
FSIA and section 1330(a) applicable to alien suits against foreign
referring to § 1331 standards ofjurisdiction as the "other usual ground" for federal juris-
diction. In any event, Vinson does not give the source of Congress's power to confer
jurisdiction when the "usual grounds" of jurisdiction are missing. Certainly, in the
absence of the "usual" § 1331 basis of jurisdiction, jurisdiction could be based on a fed-
eral ingredient in the background of the cause of action. This type of jurisdiction is
within the limits of article III.
103. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1834). Professor
Mishkin recognizes that this is a possible basis for jurisdiction under article Ill. Mishkin,
supra note 46 at 194, 195.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
106. See Glidden Co., v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 610 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring). But
see Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933). Only three Justices in Zdanok
were willing to overrule the Williams holding that the judicial power of article III does
not extend to controversies in which the United States is a defendant. The majority,
however, did recognize that the Court of Claims was an article III court. Writing for a
plurality, Justice Harlan found that the judicial power of the Court of Claims was based
on either the "arising under" clause or the judicial power over controversies to which the
United States is a party. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557, 562-68 (1962).
In addition, Justice Harlan would have grounded the judicial power supporting the
Federal Tort Claims Act solely upon article III. Id. at 565. Some commentators, how-
ever, suggest that an action against the United States is always an action arising under
federal law. Mishkin, supra note 46 at 193; WRIGHT &MILLER, supra note 46 at § 3654,
171.
107. WRI.GHT & MILLER, supra note 46 at § 3562, 397-414, at § 3565, 433.
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
states.108 The district court looked to the statute itself to determine
whether Congress intended the FSIA to confer jurisdiction over such
suits. The court found that section 1330(a) conferred jurisdiction in
"any non-jury civil action" against a foreign state. 0 9 The court also
concluded that if section 1330(a) did not provide jurisdiction in such
cases "the purpose of the removal statute would be thwarted.""u 0
Despite the court's findings, there are significant indications in
the legislative history of the FSIA that Congress did not intend to
provide federal jurisdiction over suits between aliens and foreign
states. Congress enacted the FSIA under its power to prescribe the
jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to article I, section 8,
clause 9, and article III, section 2, and under its power to make all
laws necessary and proper for exercising the judicial power over con-
troversies between "a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states.""' In this manner, Congress clearly intended FSIA suits to
be brought under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The legislative history of the FSIA, therefore, refutes any argu-
ment that Congress intended it to confer federal jurisdiction over
suits brought by alien plaintiffs against foreign states. If Congress
believed that under article I it could grant federal jurisdiction
outside the limitations of article III, it would not have claimed that
its power to enact the FSIA was based on article III. It might be
argued, however, that Congress simply listed every possible constitu-
tional basis for conferring jurisdiction, and that it did not believe
that its authority to enact the FSIA had to be grounded in article
111.112 Further, in Verlinden the court claimed that the FSIA must
provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in order for a foreign
state to be able to remove the case to federal court. In 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d) Congress intended to allow foreign states to remove to fed-
eral court; if the FSIA did not provide jurisdiction, the court con-
cluded that this Congressional intent would be frustrated. It is
significant, however, that Congress based its power to enact the
removal statute" 3 exclusively upon the judicial power over actions
108. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292; Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 320.
109. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
110. Id. The district court reasoned that if § 1330(a) did not provide federal court
jurisdiction, a foreign state would not be able to remove a case from state to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). In such a case, the foreign state would be forced to
conduct a defense in state court. The court concluded that this was contrary to Con-
gress's intent to make a federal forum available to all foreign states. Id. See House
Report, supra note 3 at 6631.
Ill. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; art. HI, § 2, cl. 1; House Report, supra note 3 at
6611.
112. See supra note 110-11 and accompanying text.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
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"between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States.""14
Contrary to the district court's findings in Verlinden, therefore, Con-
gress intended only suits between citizens and foreign states to be
removable. It did not expressly provide for removal in a state court
action between an alien and a foreign state.
In addition, Congress amended the diversity statute" 5 to
exclude actions against foreign states. 16 The House Report states
that "[s]ince jurisdiction in actions against foreign states. . . is...
treated by . . . § 1330, a similar jurisdictional basis under § 1332
becomes superfluous."' 1 7 Congress clearly intended section 1330 to
"replace former section 1332(a) with regard to suits against foreign
states. It is doubtful that when Congress enacted section 1330(a)
without discussion it intended to confer jurisdiction upon alien suits
against foreign states-cases which previously were beyond the
scope of federal jurisdiction. The purpose of the FSIA is not to pro-
tect aliens, but rather to protect United States citizens, United States
businessmen, and United States property owners by granting these
persons access to the federal courts in suits against foreign states." 8
Although the legislative history of the FSIA frequently refers to
"plaintiffs," "litigants," and "private parties,"' 19 this does not neces-
sarily include foreign "plaintiffs," "litigants," and "private par-
ties."'120 When Congress enacted the FSIA it did not intend to make
United States courts "international courts of claims."' 121
Although the legislative history of the FSIA does not expressly
indicate Congress's intention regarding alien suits against foreign
states, it supports a construction of section 1330(a) limiting federal
jurisdiction to actions brought by United States citizens. The judi-
cial policy of construing statutes as consistent with the Constitution
114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; House Report, supra note 3 at 6632. This is espe-
dally significant in light of the district court's rationale in Verlinden. In Verlinden, the
court claimed that the FSIA must act as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in order
for a foreign state to be able to remove its case from state to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d). See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). The predecessor of section 1332(a) did not provide
federal jurisdiction over suits between aliens and foreign states.
116. House Report, supra note 3 at 6613.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 6605.
119. Id. at 6605, 6606.
120. The court of appeals in Verlinden thought that § 1330(a) applied to foreign plain-
tiffs. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 324.
121. Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomr. on Administrative Law and Govern-
mental Relations of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation
Section, Civil Division, Dep't of Justice). For a discussion of the international effects of
becoming an "international court of claims," see infra notes 142-48 and accompanying
text.
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whenever possible also mandates a limited interpretation of section
1330(a).' 22 Thus, it was unnecessary for the district court or the
appellate court in Verlinden to address the constitutional issues.
IV. FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The clear import of Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria123
is that section 1330(a) does not give the federal courts jurisdiction
over suits brought by aliens against foreign states when no federal
substantive law is at issue. There is, however, no constitutional limi-
tation upon the jurisdiction of state courts. The FSIA restricts state
court jurisdiction only in those cases where a foreign state is entitled
to immunity. 24 Consequently, an alien may bring a foreign state
before a state court provided there are minimum contacts present to
satisfy personal jurisdiction requirements. 25 State courts, however,
have no more reason to protect an alien plaintiff than do the federal
courts. The question arises, therefore, as to whether Congress should
open both federal and state courts to alien actions against foreign
states, or whether Congress should deny aliens access to all federal
and state courts in such cases.
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
If the United States is the only forum available for an alien
plaintiff's valid claim, it might be argued that Congress should pro-
vide a forum in which to litigate that claim. Most alien plaintiffs,
however, may bring an action in the courts of their own countries.
26
In Verlinden, the plaintiff's home country, the Netherlands, does not
apply sovereign immunity in cases involving commercial acts.12 7
Thus, Verlinden could have pursued the action in his own country, a
forum in which Central Bank is subject to the same standards of
immunity that are present in the United States. It is significant that
122. See supra note 22.
123. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
124. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-06 (1976).
125. Cf. J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlay's Bank (Uganda), 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d
168, 371 N.Y.S. 892 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1976), a pre-FSIA case in which an
Israeli company sued a Ugandan bank in New York state court. The New York Court of
Appeals allowed jurisdiction over an alien action against a foreign state. Although Zeevi
arose before Congress enacted the FSIA, the FSIA did nothing to alter state court juris-
diction over alien actions. The FSIA only restricts jurisdiction of state courts where a
foreign state is entitled to immunity. Thus, the Zeevi case still could support New York
jurisdiction over Verlinden's action against the Central Bank of Nigeria.
126. For a comprehensive discussion of foreign standards of immunity from jurisdic-
tion and execution, see Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before NationalAuthori-
ties, 149 ACADEMIE DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL 86 (1976).
127. See id. at 150; Voskuil, The International Law of State Immunity, as Rleeted in
the Dutch Civil Law ofExecution, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 245, 255 (1979).
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the United States adopted the restrictive theory of immunity primar-
ily to align United States sovereign immunity law with the sovereign
immunity law of most other nations. 28 Almost all Western Euro-
pean nations adhere to the restrictive theory of immunity. 129
Although an alien plaintiff may be able to sue in his own courts,
the plaintiff may not be able to recover on a judgment of those
courts. The FSIA and the laws of most European countries allow a
limited right of execution against a foreign state's property. 30 It is
unclear, however, whether Dutch law follows the restrictive theory
128. See Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952); Hearings, supra note 121 at 33
(statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State); Id. at 32 (statement of
Bruno Ristau). When the State Department decided to follow the restrictive theory of
immunity, Mr. Tate noted that almost all Western countries embraced some form of the
restrictive theory. Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 985 (1952).
129. Italy applies the most restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. In Italy, there is
no immunity whenever a foreign state is sued as a private person, when a foreign state
has acted in the domain of private law, or when a foreign state is involved in acts involv-
ing a commercial activity. See Sucharitkul, supra note 126 at 126. Belgium was one of
the first countries to adopt the restrictive theory, allowing immunity only where a foreign
state has acted in its sovereign capacity. See id. at 132; Verhoeven, Immuniyfrom Exe-
cution of Foreign States in Belgium Law, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 73, 73 (1979). France
and Germany also restrict immunity to noncommercial acts. See Sucharitkul, supra note
126 at 143-45, 148-49; Seidl-Hohenveldern, State Immunity. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 60-61 (1979). Finally, the United Kingdom denies
immunity if the proceedings relate to a commercial transaction, a contractual obligation
to be performed in the United Kingdom, or a tort committed in the United Kingdom.
See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3, 4, 5.
In addition, the European Convention on State Immunity, openedfor signature May
16, 1972, 74 EuRoP. T.S., enacted into force (1976), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Convention on Immunity], governs sovereign immunity in disputes
involving a private person of a Contracting State and another Contracting State. The
Convention specifically denies immunity where the proceedings relate to a contractual
obligation of the State, employment contracts, and torts. Id. at ch. I, arts. 4, 5, 11. As of
1979, only Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and the United Kingdom had ratified the Conven-
tion. See Council of Europe, Chart Showing Signatures and Ratfcalons of Council of
Europe Conventions and Agreements, 41 (1979); Higgins, Execution of State Property
United Kingdom Practice, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 35, 54 (1979). The Convention, how-
ever, provides an example of the acceptance of the restrictive theory of immunity in
Western Europe.
130. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976). In Europe, only Italy grants absolute
immunity from execution to a foreign state's property. Condorelli & Sbolci, Measures of
Execution Against the Property of Foreign States: The Law and Practice in Italy, 10
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 197, 230 (1979). This immunity is limited, however, to those foreign
states that grant Italy a reciprocal absolute immunity from execution in courts of the
foreign state. Id. at 204, 230. Belgium has followed a highly restrictive theory of immu-
nity from execution since 1951. Sucharitkul, supra note 126 at 136, 137. See Verhoeven,
supra note 129 at 77, 78. West Germany will enforce a judgment against a foreign state's
property as long as the assets involved are not used for public services. Seidl-Hohenvel-
dern, supra note 129 at 66. The West German courts executed against the assets of the
Central Bank of Nigeria in a case involving claims similar to those found in Verlinden.
Id. at 67. Thus, the West German courts allowed an execution against a foreign state's
property that even the FSIA would prohibit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976). Finally, the
United Kingdom will enforce a judgment against property that is "for the time being in
use or intended for use for commercial purposes." State Immunity Act, 1978 c. 33,
§§ 13(2)(b), 13(4).
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of immunity from execution. The only applicable statutory provi-
sion allows "execution of court decisions. . subject to the excep-
tions acknowledged under international law."131 The international
law relating to immunity of execution, however, is unclear. 32 At
least one commentator argues for the application of article 438(a) of
the Dutch Domestic Code of Civil Procedure, which denies execu-
tion of judgments only against "property intended for public serv-
ice."' 33 Thus, business property would be subject to execution.
Under this theory, the plaintiff in Verlinden would have been able to
execute a judgment against any Nigerian business property in the
Netherlands. 34
Consequently, even if an alien plaintiff is denied access to
United States courts, in all probability he still would have access to a
forum where he could litigate his claim against a foreign state and
execute his judgment. Denying an alien plaintiff access to a United
States forum may result in an inconvenience to the alien, but it will
not necessarily be fatal to the alien's claim.
In addition, an assertion of jurisdiction in suits between aliens
and foreign states would deviate from current international practice.
Most European countries will probably not allow a non-resident
alien to sue a foreign state in their courts. There is no specific law in
any European country addressing jurisdiction over suits between
aliens and foreign states. Most European countries grant jurisdic-
tion, however, only when one of the parties is domiciled in the forum
The European Convention on State Immunity prohibits execution against property of
a Contracting State in the territory of another Contracting State. Convention on Immu-
nity, supra note 129, at art. 23. A Contracting State, however, must give effect to a judg-
ment against it by a court of another Contracting State. Id. at art. 20(1). In addition, a
plaintiff may execute against the property of a Contracting State if both its own Con-
tracting State and the defendant's Contracting State declare that they will allow such
executions. Id. at art. 26. Thus, although there is no explicit right of execution in the
forum country, a citizen of one Contracting State will almost always be able to recover a
judgment against another Contracting State.
131. Article 13a Wet AB, Dutch Civil Code, reprinted in Voskuil, supra note 127 at
260.
132. Even within those European countries that adhere to the restrictive theory of
immunity, the exact parameters of that immunity are not consistent from country to
country. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See Article 13a Wet AB, Dutch Civil Code, reprinted in Voskuil, supra note 127
at 261, 262.
134. If Nigeria has no property in the Netherlands, Verlinden may still be able to
recover in the United States, either in state court, see UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY -
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT, §§ 1-11; N.Y. CIr. PRAc. LAW §§ 5301-09 (McKinney
1978), or in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976). Because § 1609 grants a for-
eign state immunity from execution in, but not from the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the federal courts may have jurisdiction in actions by aliens against a foreign state. Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Thus, the federal rules on execution may provide a federal
question in actions on a judgment. See supra notes 37-107 and accompanying text for
discussion on jurisdiction over an original cause of action brought by an alien.
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state. 135 The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters136 grants jurisdiction
only in cases where one of the parties is domiciled in the forum
state.' 37 Thus, because a foreign state cannot be regarded as a
domicillary of another state, most European countries would grant
jurisdiction in actions brought by alien plaintiffs against foreign
states only if the alien plaintiff were a domiciliary of the forum state.
The European standard does not permit a nonresident alien to bring
a foreign state into the courts of a European country. Thus, the
United States would deviate from accepted European practice if it
opened its courts to all alien actions brought against foreign states.' 38
It is unclear what the precise international effects might be if
Congress did confer federal court jurisdiction over suits between
aliens and foreign states. Principles of international comity and sov-
ereignty have always played a primary role in a forum state's deci-
sion regarding whether or not to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
country.139 Such considerations have prompted courts to refrain
from adjudicating the validity of acts of state.' 40 Similarly, infringe-
135. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Luxembourg all recog-
nize a defendant's domicile in the forum as a sufficient jurisdictional basis. See I.G.
DELAuME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, §§ 8.12, 21.22 (1980). In addition, in France
and Luxembourg there is jurisdiction if the plaintiff or defendant is a native of the for-
eign country. See French Civil Code, art. 14, 15, reprinted in DELAUME, supra at § 8.02.
Only West Germany and Denmark are willing to assert jurisdiction in cases where
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is a citizen or a domiciliary of the foreign country,
as long as the defendant owns property in the forum state. See DELAUME, supra at
§§ 8.10, 8.17, 8.18. Thus, an alien plaintiff could sue an alien defendant in the West
German courts if the defendant owned property in West Germany.
136. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, done at Brussels, September 27, 1968, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969).
137. Id. at art. 2, 4. For example, a United States citizen domiciled in France would
be able to bring an action in a French court against a Canadian citizen domiciled in
Canada. See DELAUME, Supra note 135 at §§ 8.11, 8.18-20. Thus, he may also be able to
sue a foreign state in the French courts.
138. One could argue that opening the courts of the United States to all suits by aliens
against a foreign state would not deviate from the European practice. In the European
cases, the basis of jurisdiction is personal jurisdiction. Because a United States court
would impose a similar personal jurisdiction requirement on all suits by aliens against a
foreign country, there might not be a substantial discrepancy between the United States
and European practices. In European courts, however, a foreign state could never be a
"domiciliary" of a foreign country; thus, only an alien plaintiff domiciled in the foreign
state could sue a foreign state. In the United States, on the other hand, if the courts had
jurisdiction over alien actions under facts such as those presented in Verlinden, this juris-
diction would include all alien actions regardless of whether the alien was a United
States domiciliary. Thus, despite the similar personal jurisdiction tests, there would be a
substantial discrepancy between the United States and European practices.
139. One of the fundamental rationales for the theory of absolute immunity is that a
foreign sovereign never intends to subject himself to "jurisdiction incompatible with his
dignity, and the dignity of his nation." Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
140. See Oetien v. Central Leather Co., 289 U.S. 297, 303, 304 (1918); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ment of sovereignty has been a volatile issue in establishing the
boundaries of the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust laws.14 1 Significantly, in drafting the FSIA Congress recog-
nized the "potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states."' 42
Surely foreign sensitivity to United States actions would increase if
the United States extended jurisdiction to suits brought by aliens
against foreign states.
In view of the "potential sensitivity" of asserting jurisdiction
over actions between aliens and foreign states, opening the courts of
the United States to such suits might invite retaliatory action by
other countries. Foreign states have often taken steps to avoid com-
promising their sovereignty. 143 These nations might retaliate by
opening their courts to alien actions against the United States, 144 by
attempting to avoid United States courts by reducing their commer-
cial activity affecting the United States,145 or by enacting legislation
to block the effects of the adjudication of alien actions in the courts
of the United States. 46
Of course, foreign nations may also retaliate against the asser-
tion of jurisdiction by the United States over foreign states in actions
brought by United States citizens. The United States' interest in pro-
viding its citizens with a forum in which to litigate their claims, how-
Although avoiding possible infringement of foreign sovereignty is an important consider-
ation in applying the "act of state" doctrine, the Supreme Court has found that the doc-
trine is in fact founded on the separation of powers and the problem of the competency
of the judicial branch to make and implement decisions affecting international relations.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
141. See Marks, State Department Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 153, 153 (1978). In addition, the importance of comity in antitrust
enforcement actions is increasing. Griffin, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Govern-
ments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 137, 146 (1978).
142. House Report, supra note 3 at 6631.
143. For example, consider the decline of foreign state arbitration in London prior to
enactment of the Arbitration Act, ch. 42. Before the Act, the High Court in England
could intervene in arbitration proceedings to require litigation of "any question of law"
and to decide issues of law. See Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 21. Conse-
quently, a foreign state that submitted to arbitration in England also risked submitting to
the jurisdiction of the English courts. Rather than compromise their sovereignty, most
foreign states simply avoided arbitration in London. Shenton & Toland, London as a
Venuefor International Arbitratiorn The Arbitration Act, 1979, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 643, 651 (1980).
144. In both Italy and Belgium jurisdiction based on the nationality or domicile of a
party is intended as a retaliatory measure against the French jurisdictional rule.
DELAUME, supra note 135 at §§ 8.08, 8.09, 8.16, 8.17. See supra note 128 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976) (disallowing executions on funds of central banks to
avoid discouraging foreign deposits.) House Report, supra note 3 at 6630. This is simi-
larly applicable to cases in which alien suits are allowed because the commercial activity
of a foreign state defeats immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
146. Compare with blocking legislation enacted to resist antitrust enforcement.
Marks, supra note 141 at 153, 154.
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ever, outweighs the harm of any possible retaliation. 147 The United
States interests in providing alien plaintiffs a forum are not nearly as
strong. Most aliens have alternative forums in which to press their
claims. 148 Although the United States may have some interest in
resolving such disputes where a foreign state's commercial activity
affects the United States, 149 this interest is minimal; allowing these
suits into United States courts primarily benefits the alien plaintiff.
Allowing alien plaintiffs to sue foreign states in United State courts
is of no direct benefit to United States citizens. In enacting the
FSIA, Congress recognized that granting federal jurisdiction over
cases in which the United States has little interest could "give rise to
serious friction in United States' foreign relations." 150 Congress con-
sequently prohibited jurisdiction based merely upon attachment of
property within the United States.' 5' Similar caution is appropriate
when considering jurisdiction over alien actions against foreign
states.
B. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Congress should not open the federal courts to all alien actions
against foreign states. Providing jurisdiction in all such cases, even if
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity, would alienate foreign
nations without promoting any significant United States' interests.
Denying jurisdiction does not seriously injure an alien's ability to
litigate a claim. Because in most cases an alien may sue in his own
courts, there is no need to provide him with a United States forum.
Thus, Congress should not provide federal jurisdiction in alien
actions against foreign states except where there is a significant
United States' interest expressed in federal law. In addition, Con-
gress should restrict state court jurisdiction over alien actions against
foreign states in order to prevent state courts from offending foreign
states. The following draft of § 1330(a) provides a possible solution:
§ 1330(a)(1): The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of
any nonjury civil action, either arising under a federal
law other than the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, or
brought by a citizen, against a foreign state.
(2): State Courts shall not have jurisdiction over suits brought
by a non-resident alien and not arising under a law of the
United States other than the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act.
147. See Hearings, supra note 121 at 30 (statement of Ristau).
148. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
149. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
150. House Report, supra note 3 at 6626.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(2) (1976).
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This draft statute restricts suits between aliens and foreign states and
provides federal courts with jurisdiction. It also allows state courts
to retain jurisdiction in suits brought by United States citizens.
Finally, it provides for federal and state court jurisdiction in suits
involving federal substantive law. The legislative history of such a
statute should make clear that federal substantive "law" does not
include federal law governing immunity and that the FSIA does not
represent a federal substantive law of liability.
If Congress concludes, however, that federal courts should be
open to alien actions against foreign states, it must enact federal sub-
stantive law to provide the constitutional basis of such jurisdic-
tion.152 Congress can accomplish this by incorporating applicable
state law into a federal law of liability, or by changing sovereign
immunity and its exceptions into substantive federal law unrelated
to jurisdiction. 153 Such action, however, is inadvisable.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's conclusion in Verlinden that section
1330(a) and the FSIA are purely jurisdictional is correct. The court,
however, failed to respond to the district court's arguments that the
FSIA governs substantive federal issues. In addition, because the
court found that the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute, it did not con-
sider whether the Constitution requires that the FSIA be an original
ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action in order for the case to
arise under the law of the United States. Finally, the court failed to
discuss jurisdiction based solely upon Congress's article I powers.
This Note concludes that there is no federal question jurisdic-
tion in an alien action against a foreign state where the FSIA is the
only federal law in issue. First, the issues of immunity in the FSIA
are not substantive federal law. Resolution of immunities issues
determines jurisdiction; it does not affect the substantive rights of the
parties. State law continues to govern liability. Second, sovereignimmunity is an affirmative defense; it is not an original ingredient of
the plaintiffs cause of action. Third, the FSIA cannot support juris-
diction simply as a jurisdictional statute. Congress may not confer
jurisdiction through its article I powers, but must extend the judicial
power within the limits of article III. Finally, Congress did not
intend section 1330(a) to confer jurisdiction over alien actions
against foreign states. Thus, it is clear that there is no jurisdiction in
Verlinden-type cases.
152. See supra notes 37-107 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 58, 68-70 and accompanying text.
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Congress should not confer jurisdiction in suits brought by alien
plaintiffs against foreign states. There is no need to provide alien
plaintiffs with a United States forum when alternative forums exist
in the plaintiffs' home countries--countries which in most cases
apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. In addition,
asserting jurisdiction over such suits could unnecessarily alienate
foreign states which might consider such an assertion an infringe-
ment upon their sovereignty.
Finally, Congress should clarify its intention and specifically
exclude alien plaintiffs from enjoying a grant of jurisdiction under
section 1330(a). To avoid alien suits in state courts Congress should,
through its article I powers, restrain state courts from asserting juris-
diction in suits between alien plaintiffs and foreign states. In sum,
Congress should clarify the jurisdiction of United States federal and
state courts over actions brought by alien plaintiffs against foreign
states.
Michael H. Schubert
